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“The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.  His own good, either physical or 
moral, is not a sufficient warrant.  He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it 
will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of 
others, to do so would be wise or even right… The only part of the conduct of anyone for which 
he is amenable to society is that which concerns others.”  
 
- John Stuart Mill (1859) 
 2 
Background on the Russill Fellowship: 
 Created in the aftermath of Measure 37, the Russill Fellowship is aimed at examining 
non-regulatory land use planning tools and their potential application in the Portland 
Metropolitan area, with a particular emphasis on habitat conservation.  The above-mentioned 
ballot initiative and the larger private property rights movement have given an indication that 
Oregon voters perceive inequities in the State’s land use planning system.  It is also clear that 
Oregonians still place a high value on the conservation of our state’s natural resources.  
According to a March, 2005 statewide survey, protecting farmland for farming is very important 
to 67% of respondents, protecting the environment is very important to 61%, and protecting 
wildlife habitat is very important to 58% (CFM Research, 2005).  According to a more recent 
survey commissioned by Metro, 72% of respondents indicated that a policy to “add houses in 
existing neighborhoods” comes closer to how they feel while only 16% chose “convert farm and 
forest land for growth” (12% responded with “don’t know”) (Davis, Hibbits, & Midghall, Inc., 
2006). 
Regardless of the legal status of Measure 37 or any future regulatory takings initiatives, 
the planner’s toolbox needs to be expanded, providing a wider variety of options to accomplish 
the Statewide Planning Goals.  However, as the research for this paper progressed, a more 
complicated picture of planning and the use of regulations has emerged.  It has become clear that 
non-regulatory planning instruments are no substitute for regulation in upholding Oregon’s 
Statewide Planning Goals.  The above-cited survey indicates that Oregonians do still see the 
importance of the Goals.  Thus, this paper has focused on the need for long-range planning, the 
relationship between planning and property values, the threat of sprawl in the Portland region, 
planning instruments that help to control such sprawl, and whether such instruments are able to 
attain Oregon’s Statewide Planning Goals. 
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The need for a long-range vision in land use planning: 
 The phenomenon of the “tragedy of the commons” is unfortunately all too familiar in 
natural resource management (Hardin, 1968).  Despite the long-term benefits of cooperating to 
preserve the shared environment, individuals typically make choices that seek to maximize their 
short-term gains, resulting in harms to the shared environment.  This problem is not only to be 
found on publicly held lands (the commons); one only need look at the disregard with which 
private lands have been contaminated to see that private land ownership is not always the cure to 
the problem.  As Jacobs puts it, “…we disagree about property rights and land, in part, because 
we disagree about the economics of land, especially what motivates individual land users and 
how they respond to the signals they receive from the economic, political, social, and cultural 
systems within which they live” (Jacobs, 1999). 
Unfortunately, the repercussions of an individual’s land use choices do not start and stop 
at the property boundary.  This, in essence, is what is behind the real estate mantra of “location, 
location, location.”  That is to say, the value, both monetary and as habitat, of one’s land is 
largely dependent on the land use decisions being made by neighbors and public agencies. 
Many of the most important land use decisions are being made on private lands.  
Attempts at identifying habitat conservation needs throughout the United States have indicated 
that 15% to 30% of land should be held in some form of conservation status in order to preserve 
biodiversity.  Approximately half of that land is in private ownership (Defenders of Wildlife 
2002).  Unlike land in public ownership, the use of private land is, to some degree, determined 
by the individual owner.  Unfortunately, actions on private and public lands alike can have 
negative impacts that extend beyond the property lines.  A clearer understanding of the impacts 
of land-use decisions that transcend property boundaries is necessary. 
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As Tideman (1990) points out, Pareto improvements in which an action makes at least 
one person better off and no one worse off are the “Holy Grail for economists.”  Tideman 
summarizes this as it applies to land use decisions by stating “…for any activity that a person 
might undertake at any site, if the net benefit to all persons at all other sites were positive, there 
would be a subsidy of that magnitude for the activity…”  As a corollary, “…if the net benefit to 
all persons at all other sites were negative, there would be a tax on the magnitude of the activity.”  
Of course, what is difficult here is determining what actions are positive and which are negative, 
measuring the degree of the magnitude, and ascribing a monetary value to it.  That said, the 
underlying point is that such decisions carry trans-boundary effects. 
Land-use regulation and private land values: 
 The determination of property value is not simply a product of the land use decisions 
being made by neighboring property owners.  Many factors, including regulations, affect value.  
These effects are the background against which Measure 37 passed.  Unfortunately, the 
discussion of these impacts has been drastically over-simplified and has focused on diminished 
property values with little mention of the tremendous amount of private land value attributable to 
regulation and planning.  An exploration of both the negative and positive impacts of regulations 
on property values adds nuance to this discussion.  Regulations frequently result in higher 
property values through their amenity and scarcity effects (Jaeger 2006; Brueckner 1990). 
 Land use regulations have an amenity effect on values by protecting or enhancing a 
property and its neighbors.  Protection of a property may take the form of prohibiting conflicting 
land uses, managing urban growth, or controlling pollution and congestion (Carruthers 2002; 
Byun & Esparza 2005).  Enhancement of a property may result from the provision of roads, 
sewer and water service, parks, schools, etc.  These protections and enhancements that constitute 
the amenity effect are typically the result of public investments that are funded through property 
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taxes.  In this case, the property tax itself imposes a cost, but the net benefits to private land 
owners drastically outweigh those costs.  Without such services, a property’s value is limited. 
Jaeger draws attention to the legal concept of “average reciprocity of advantage” which 
has been used as a justification for denying compensation in some regulatory takings claims (the 
taking of private property for public purposes without just compensation as described in the 5th 
and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution).  In essence, the concept can be explained as 
follows: “While each of us is burdened somewhat by such restrictions, we, in turn, benefit 
greatly from the restrictions that are placed on others.” (Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. 
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 (1987) as quoted in Jaeger, 2006).  This benefit is not simply an 
abstract concept, but translates into higher property values that are the result of land use 
regulations. 
 Regulations also have a scarcity effect on property values; by limiting potential uses of 
properties in a particular location, regulations reduce the supply of available lands for any given 
use, thus increasing the value of those lands where the use is allowed.  Because this scarcity 
effect is more indirect, its benefits are less obvious to property owners.  For instance, the 
exclusive farm use (EFU) designation used to preserve agricultural lands in the Willamette 
Valley has the effect of constraining the supply of developable lands, thereby increasing the 
value of lands not designated EFU. 
It would be wrong, however, to conclude that owners of EFU lands are bearing the 
burden of propping up the property values of others.  Farming, like many industries, benefits 
from agglomeration and economies of scale.  The presence of other farms supports necessary 
farm services such as suppliers, transport networks, and processors (Jaeger, 2006).  EFU zoning 
encourages such economies of scale by limiting conflicting uses such as residential development 
(conflicts may arise over noise, odors, traffic, dust, etc.). 
In their study of lands zoned exclusive agricultural use in Wisconsin, Henneberry and 
Barrows (1990) reached the conclusion that such zoning may have a negative or positive effect 
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depending on individual site characteristics.  Such regulations are typically positively capitalized 
into land values for large contiguous blocks of farmland which are more distant from urban 
areas.  Conversely, agricultural zoning is negatively capitalized into land prices for smaller 
blocks of lands that are closer to urban areas.  Rather than zoning, it would seem that the more 
important determinant of value is the proximity of urban land uses and the size of the agricultural 
parcels.  These factors diminish the afore-mentioned economies of scale that may make 
agriculture more profitable. 
Though regulations frequently have positive effects, in some cases they may reduce 
property values.  According to Jaeger, this may occur under several circumstances.  Firstly, if the 
amenity effects of a regulation are not sufficiently valued by the market and thus not reflected in 
consumers’ willingness to pay for such lands, there may be a reduction in price. 
Secondly, if a regulation produces an over-supply of lands dedicated to a particular 
purpose (for example, too many lands are zoned industrial), diminished values will be reflected 
in the market’s willingness to pay for such lands.  There is thus an onus on planners to carefully 
consider market demand when applying zoning designations. 
A third situation under which regulations may decrease property values is when the 
regulation benefits society, but that benefit is not sufficiently reflected in the value of those 
properties subject to the regulation.  This is essentially the free-rider problem that affects public 
goods, whereby there is no need for individuals to pay for the public good as they may benefit 
from it without such payment. 
A fourth circumstance where property values may be diminished due to regulations is 
more difficult to describe in classical economic terms.  Here, there may be, for instance, a 
personal desire to subdivide timber lands to provide buildable lots for family members.  The 
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personal attachment to the property makes it difficult to determine value based on comparable 
sales (Jaeger, 2006). 
Finally, Jaeger points out that the land market is ever-changing and that profitable uses of 
a property may change over time.  A land use regulation that was not an impediment to profits at 
the time of its enactment may become one as new opportunities present themselves.  Under 
Measure 37, government agencies are put in the untenable position of having to anticipate future 
market conditions when instituting regulations. 
To further complicate these issues of the effects of regulations on land values, it should 
be noted that the exemption of a single property from regulation will almost inevitably increase 
that property’s value.  This increase is likely to occur regardless of whether the regulation 
originally had a positive or negative impact on the property’s value.  The increased value would 
not exist, however, if exemptions to the regulation were handed out to everyone.  It is the 
amenity and scarcity effects created by regulations on surrounding lands that would make an 
exemption valuable to a particular property.  For instance, an exemption from an EFU 
designation would increase a property’s value because that property is surrounded by beautiful 
farm land still subject to regulations.  The exempted land also benefits from the fact that is a 
scarce developable property. 
The diminution of value attributable to a regulation is frequently confused with the value 
of the land in the absence of the regulation.  As Jaeger puts it, “…an appraiser’s estimate that a 
property’s value would rise if a given land-use regulation were removed tells us nothing 
definitive about whether the land-use regulation reduced the property’s value.”  These complex 
interactions between market forces and regulations deserve greater attention and are at the core 
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of this paper.  Given the perceived inequities of our current planning system, a more nuanced 
conversation should be encouraged. 
The need for planning at regional and state levels 
The effects of land use decisions may be seen not only on neighboring properties, but on 
neighboring jurisdictions.  The spatial patterns of urban growth are largely shaped by three major 
public policy tools: land use regulations such as urban growth boundaries, the provision of urban 
infrastructure (streets, sewers, etc.), and open space protection (Fulton et al, 2006).  Because 
urban growth management has extra-local implications it is unlikely that any one of these three 
tools would sufficiently control sprawl on its own; limiting growth in one jurisdiction may 
simply encourage sprawl elsewhere. 
The multiple benefits of growth management must be made explicit.  Though important, 
the preservation of prime agricultural lands cannot be the sole goal.  Such a single purpose will 
prove politically insufficient in the long-term (Richmond, 2000); the goals must be, more 
broadly, about making Portland more livable, lowering property taxes (which have subsidized 
sprawl), improving air and water quality, and minimizing disparities between rich suburbs and 
impoverished inner cities (Carruthers, 2002).  We all stand to benefit from a thoughtful approach 
to urban growth. 
Managing such growth at the regional or statewide level holds greater promise for 
minimizing the impacts of sprawl (Bollens 1992; Byunn & Esparza 2005).  An urban growth 
boundary without a mandate at the regional or, preferably, statewide level will not perform 
properly in limiting sprawl.  A growth management mandate at the regional or state level not 
only creates the regionally agreed upon boundary, but prohibits development outside of the 
boundary, thereby slowing the conversion of vacant land to urban uses (Downs, 2005; 
Richmond, 2000). 
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Anthony’s study of state growth management regulations found that the success of such 
programs varied from state to state.   This is attributable to variations in the details of the 
programs and their strength at statewide and local levels (2004).  Georgia is an example of a state 
with a growth management program that has been largely unsuccessful in controlling sprawl.  
Georgia’s decrease in population densities from 1982 until 1997 is possibly attributable to the 
fact that the region, not the state, has primary authority over growth management, thereby 
constraining the effectiveness of the program. 
Other growth management states, particularly Washington, have seen greater success in 
controlling sprawl.  Despite the fact that Washington had a 49% increase in urban land between 
1982 and 1997, population densities increased by 1.5%.  Anthony points out several potential 
reasons for Washington’s success in increasing densities.  Its program focuses on fast-growing 
counties rather than applying strict regulations to all counties.  These fast-growing counties are 
required to closely follow local comprehensive plans and are allowed to allocate up to .5% of 
real estate transfer taxes for funding capital improvements.  There is thus an incentive that 
accompanies the regulation. 
According to Anthony (2004), Oregon has witnessed a 32.11% increase in urban lands 
from 1982 until 1997.  This is, in and of itself, not necessarily problematic.  Our statewide 
growth management program has no intention to stop growth, but rather to slow it down and 
make more efficient use of lands currently within urban growth boundaries before expanding.  
Population density is a good measure of the efficiency of the conversion of rural land to urban 
use.  Unfortunately, Oregon has seen a decrease, albeit small at -2.02%, in population densities 
during the years 1982 to 1997.  This is compared with an average decrease in population density 
of -15.77% for states without growth management regulations (Anthony, 2004). 
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The control of urban sprawl is at the heart of this paper’s discussion for it is sprawl that 
poses the greatest threat to the Portland metropolitan region’s agricultural lands and natural areas 
as well as the livability of the city.  Furthermore, it provides a fairly concise illustration of the 
benefits of planning and the costs of not doing so.  Beyond sprawl’s impacts on the landscape, it 
is becoming clear that there are substantially higher infrastructure costs associated with a 
sprawling urban layout (Carruthers, 2002).  This is particularly the case for services such as 
roads, water, and sewers.  Speir and Stephenson (2002) identify the larger lot sizes and greater 
distance to existing service centers that are typical of sprawl as the factors which have the 
greatest impact on water and sewage costs.  An increase in lot size from .25 to 1 acre nearly 
doubles the costs of providing water service.  Unfortunately, these costs are not fully borne by 
the developers and passed on to home buyers.  Rather, existing tax payers subsidize wasteful 
growth patterns, raising issues of equity (Carruthers, 2002). 
Further difficulties mark the pricing and timing of infrastructure provision.  Ideally, 
infrastructure would be priced at marginal cost (Knaap et al 2001), that is, the cost of providing 
the extra unit of infrastructure.  Doing so would reflect the true costs of new development.  
Given the economies of scale associated with infrastructure such as roads and sewers, it is 
typically not possible to increase capacity as needed without large investments and is thus not 
practical to determine marginal costs.  Thus, infrastructure is priced at long-run average cost 
(total cost divided by total payers), resulting in sprawling urban growth (Knaap et al 2001).  
Given this shortcoming, other land use planning instruments must accompany the provision of 
infrastructure in order to ensure the efficient use of land and public services (Knaap et al 2001). 
In order to better coordinate development and the provision of infrastructure, the state of 
Florida, as a part of its 1985 Growth Management Act, enacted a policy of concurrency requiring 
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that appropriate infrastructure be in place at the time of new developments.  The policy has had 
mixed results.  On the positive side, concurrency provides a linkage between planning and 
implementation.  Unfortunately, the result has been reluctance on the part of legislators to make 
key decisions on infrastructure for lack of funding sources.  Local bureaucracies have 
implemented concurrency, but with frequently ambiguous and inconsistent practices in order to 
maintain its political feasibility (Ben-Zadok and Gale, 2001). 
Federal policies that encourage sprawl 
 It is worth noting that any argument that the free-market knows best when it comes to 
where and when to develop is drastically over-simplified.  Beyond the above-mentioned 
allocation of the costs of sprawl, the Federal government has a number of policies that have 
undermined small scale agriculture and led to the over-valuation of urban lands.  These policies 
include massive investments in highways and other infrastructure, Federal Housing 
Administration mortgage guarantees, and income tax policies that allow for the deduction of 
mortgage interest and property taxes (Jackson, 2000).  While these policies have done much to 
bring prosperity to the United States, it has been at the expense of long-term environmental 
health.  Any discussion of regulation’s negative impacts on property values must also 
acknowledge these policies that have inflated values and encouraged unsustainable urban sprawl. 
Oregon’s Measure 37 has forced a reassessment of the regulations that form the backbone 
of Oregon’s statewide planning system.  It is the purpose of this paper to look specifically at the 
economic and societal motives for controlling sprawl and conserving ecosystems in the Portland 
metropolitan region, with a particular emphasis on how society may share the benefits and 
burdens of regulation.  This is with the recognition that regulation plays an important role in the 
function of such land use planning tools.  It will also be the purpose of this paper to identify the 
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characteristics of a “good” land use planning tool with particular attention paid to the issues of 
equity (who pays and who benefits). 
The grey area between regulatory and non-regulatory land use planning tools: 
A review of existing land use planning tools quickly leads one to the conclusion that most 
such tools are neither purely regulatory, nor purely non-regulatory.  Most conservation 
mechanisms that are regarded as being non-regulatory have, on some level, a regulatory 
component that allows them to function.  The fuzzy distinction between regulatory and non-
regulatory approaches shows up in programs like carbon banking that attempt to ascribe a market 
value to conservation activities.  While a polluting firm is not explicitly compelled to offset 
carbon dioxide emissions, the company may find that, in light of regulations that limit emissions, 
purchasing carbon credits makes more economic sense than investing in new technology to cut 
emissions.  Similarly transferable development rights (TDR) programs, typically regarded as 
being a market approach to conservation, will not function absent regulations limiting 
development in the area to be conserved.  Without such regulation, it is entirely up to the private 
landowner to decide whether to develop their property or sell their development credits.  
Similarly, it is zoning regulations that create the framework and, ideally, the demand for 
transferring development credits in the area to be developed at increased density (the “receiving” 
area). 
Thus, it appears to be the case that land use planning tools fall into four broad categories 
with frequent overlap and hybridization: 
1. Pure regulation – In this category are, for example, urban growth boundaries, 
classical Euclidean zoning, building codes, and federal regulations such as the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA).  While not technically a land use planning tool, 
the ESA has profound implications for the management of both public and private 
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lands in the United States.  In mandating that listed species will be protected 
regardless of costs, the ESA sets a fairly rigid standard for how lands may be 
used.1 
2. Mitigation – Included here are many of the market-based strategies for mitigating 
pollution or the adverse effects of development: transferable development rights, 
mitigation banks, development impact fees, carbon banking, and tradable 
pollution permits.  In essence, these mechanisms attempt to attach market values 
to public goods such as ecosystem services and clean air.  The decision to comply 
with a regulation or to purchase an exemption is up to the individual. 
3. Subsidies and Incentives – Included here are programs in which government 
agencies use incentives or subsidies to encourage private landowners to manage 
their properties according to standards which would otherwise not be required.  
An example of such a program is the USDA’s Conservation Reserve Program. 
4. Purely voluntary programs – This category includes land use planning tools such 
as the government purchase of lands from willing sellers, purchase of 
conservation easements from willing sellers, and government-sponsored 
education programs to encourage, but not require, good stewardship practices. 
Many land use planning tools have elements from several of these categories.  This is 
perhaps a reflection of the growing consensus that in order for conservation efforts to achieve 
long-term success, there needs to be a regulatory component, an economic incentive, and an 
underlying societal environmental ethic. (Uphoff and Lanholz, 1998; Shogren 2005)  Each of 
these components needs to be reinforced by the other two.  The application of these three 
                                                
1 The rigidity of the ESA has been tempered with the increased popularity of Habitat Conservation Plans in meeting 
ESA requirements.  HCP’s allow for the incidental taking of a species if the HCP produces a net positive effect on 
the species. 
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components results in a spectrum of conservation activities.   Some programs have a strong 
regulatory component and some have a strong voluntary component, but nearly all are a hybrid 
of the two.  In all cases, the development of a widely accepted environmental ethic is essential 
for a program’s long-term success. 
Mitigation: 
The attachment of market values to ecosystem services is the basis for land use planning 
tools that allow for the purchase of exemption from regulations.  Daily posits that an ecosystem 
service contains all “…the conditions and processes through which natural ecosystems, and the 
species that make them up, sustain and fulfill human life” (Daily, 1997).  Forests, for instance, 
perform a variety of such services such as reducing erosion, moderating heat gain during 
summer, and absorbing carbon dioxide, a greenhouse gas linked with global warming.  Similarly, 
wetlands filter water and serve as a buffer in floodplains.  Absent these natural processes, we are 
faced with the need for relatively expensive engineered solutions such as water filtration plants.  
Beyond the pragmatic arguments for ecosystem services, most people recognize nature’s 
intrinsic value.  The challenge is to develop a formal system of compensating landowners for the 
non-market benefits of preserving their land’s natural assets (Daily and Ellison 2002). 
As a public good, intact ecosystems suffer from the free-rider problem.  That is to say, 
individuals may receive the benefits of intact ecosystems in their state or region, but may face no 
need to pay for this benefit.  Value is typically defined in the context of supply and demand for a 
good or a service.  It can be defined as a consumer’s willingness to pay or the minimum amount 
an individual would require to give up a good or service.  Absent the need to pay for a public 
good, the determination of that public good’s value becomes difficult. 
An altruistic land owner may have the luxury of conserving their property without regard 
for the opportunity costs of doing so.  These opportunity costs may include foregone profits from 
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subdividing the property and selling off the lots or harvesting the property’s timber.  Given that 
there are carrying costs such as taxes and mortgage payments associated with land ownership, 
the landowner typically has a need to find profitable uses for the land. 
Carbon Sequestration: 
One example of an ecosystem service is the sequestration of carbon dioxide that is 
performed by trees during photosynthesis.  A forest kept in its natural state acts as a carbon bank 
and its owner may receive payments for its carbon credits.  These payments come from firms 
who are required to offset their carbon dioxide emissions.  Similar programs could be set up for 
other ecosystem services.  The complication is in determining the allocation of credits.  There 
must also be a regulatory component that compels firms to purchase these credits.  The Climate 
Trust, a Portland non-profit, is actively engaged in carbon offset programs.  Similarly the 
Chicago Climate Exchange is a legally-binding greenhouse gas trading system.  Offset sites 
(those sites that are left in a forested state) could be established in the Portland metropolitan 
region to provide a market mechanism for compensating forest owners that provide a public 
good.  Carbon sequestration programs, though promising, are not able to function on a strategic, 
landscape-wide basis because there is nothing compelling a forest owner to set up such a bank. 
Mitigation or Conservation Banking: 
 Similar in concept to a carbon bank, the owner of significant habitat can, using a habitat 
or species inventory of their land, sell credits to developers whose projects negatively impact that 
particular type of habitat or species.  As with a carbon bank, this requires a regulatory component 
to mandate mitigation, to affirm the bank’s credits, and to set the number of credits needed to 
mitigate a particular development project.  The mitigation bank land needs to be conserved in 
perpetuity, utilizing a conservation easement.  Early forms of conservation banks were 
completed on a case by case basis at the site of the new development.  Resulting in fragmented 
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habitats, these early conservation banks frequently lacked long-range management plans 
(Parkhurst and Shogren 2005).  In their more recent form, conservation banks are set up in 
advance of any development in anticipation of a demand for mitigation credits.  Such banks are 
able to capitalize on economies of scale, thereby conserving larger blocks of contiguous habitat.  
In this way, conservation bank owners are compensated for their provision of a public good and 
developers are given a degree of flexibility in meeting the goals of regulations. 
Stormwater Credit Market 
 The impermeable surfaces that accompany urban development create a need for handling 
stormwater runoff.  As stormwater flows across these surfaces, it picks up pollutants that are then 
carried into the region’s rivers and creeks.  With 80 to 100 billion gallons of precipitation per 
year, Portland’s costs of handling this runoff are substantial (Portland Bureau of Environmental 
Services, 2006).  Recent best management practices attempt to minimize these costs through on-
site management of stormwater, thus lessening the demand on the sewage system.  The Portland 
Bureau of Environmental Services is investigating the possibility of a private market for 
stormwater management services which may be achieved through relatively low-tech means 
such as vegetated swales, porous pavers, and eco-roofs.  Integrating stormwater management 
into the built environment is potentially less expensive than sewage systems and typically also 
has aesthetic benefits.  It is likely that any such market for stormwater credits will focus around 
the maintenance of lands in their natural state, thus providing a source of revenue for land 
conservation.  Credits would be purchased by developers for whom on-site stormwater 
management is not possible.  
Transferable development rights: 
Transferable development rights (TDR) are based on the severability of the bundle of 
rights associated with a property.  A TDR program is initiated in order to discourage 
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development in a prescribed area of private land ownership.  This area which has been selected 
for its ecosystem value is called the “sending area” because development rights are “sent” and 
extinguished by means of sale.  A “receiving” area is also designated.  Owners of land in the 
receiving area are able to purchase development rights from the sending area and by doing so are 
permitted to build at higher density than would otherwise be allowable under the applicable 
zoning designation. 
In principle, a TDR program sounds like a perfect market solution to a conservation 
problem; habitats are conserved using a free market mechanism and greater urban densities are 
achieved.  Unfortunately, successful implementation of a TDR program can be complicated and 
they have frequently failed altogether.  Problems typically arise in the designation of the 
receiving area (where higher density development is desired) and predicting what the demand for 
higher density will be (Machemer & Kaplowitz 2002).  This demand is contingent upon the 
receiving area having a lower base density zoning than demanded by the market.  A TDR 
program that fails to function will lead to the receiving area being built at lower density than 
desired. 
In order to avoid creating such an undesirably low-density development pattern, the cost 
of buying development credits must not exceed the cost of developing outside of the receiving 
area (unless developers are willing to pay the extra cost because of the location of the receiving 
area).  The value of the development right must reflect both the development potential of the 
sending area and what a developer in the receiving area would pay to build an additional unit.  
Though the government does not determine the value of development credits, it does determine 
how many credits are allocated to each sending area property, how large the sending area is, and 
the size and location of the receiving area.  Additionally the government may act as an exchange 
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bank for credits and must monitor sending area properties whose development rights have been 
sold to ensure compliance with any land use restrictions. 
TDR programs have often failed because there were no bans on development in the 
sending (conservation) area (Mittra 1996; Machemer & Kaplowitz 2002).  Absent such a 
restriction, the landowner may ultimately decide to build on their property regardless of whether 
or not fair market value is being offered for the development right.  Thus, a TDR program will 
not function in the absence of regulations, so calling it a non-regulatory tool is not completely 
accurate.  What it can achieve is greater equity.  However, it does not necessarily avoid claims of 
regulatory takings on the sending properties if sending area owners don’t view the ability to sell 
credits as just compensation for the regulation.  Furthermore, the legality of a TDR program may 
be challenged by a receiving area developer on the grounds that the need to purchase a 
development credit represents an unconstitutional exaction (Parkhurst and Shogren 2005). 
Mittra identifies the geographic proximity of the sending and receiving areas as another 
factor that determines the success of a TDR program.  The two areas must be close enough that 
both recognize the benefits of the TDR program.  If the sending area is too distant from the 
receiving area, a negative public sentiment may arise in the receiving area which is witnessing 
increased densities, but not seeing the conservation benefits (Mittra, 1996).  Similarly, the 
receiving area must have sufficient infrastructure and public services to accommodate the 
increased density being achieved through the TDR program. 
Application of a TDR program in the Portland metropolitan area: 
 There currently are TDR programs in Portland that are concerned with the preservation of 
historic properties.  However, there is not a significant TDR program aimed at conservation of 
habitat and farmland.  The feasibility of a large scale TDR program in Portland will be 
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dependent upon the afore-mentioned conditions as well as determining what effects the urban 
growth boundary would have on any such program. 
Under its newly adopted Nature in Neighborhoods initiative (Metro’s attempt to be in 
compliance with Statewide Planning Goal 5), Metro has drafted a model ordinance that may be 
adopted by local governments.  This model ordinance and the Regional Framework Plan enable 
localities to initiate TDR programs.  However, there does not seem to be an interest on the part of 
Metro to run a region-wide TDR program.  The feasibility of a local jurisdiction’s TDR program 
would perhaps be increased by the need to have geographic proximity of sending and receiving 
areas.  However, in a city-run TDR, there would seem to be a greater possibility that a developer 
would simply turn their attention to a locality without a TDR program. 
 Some factors that need to be explored in order to determine the feasibility of a local TDR 
program would be: 
• Sending area 
o What are the regional conservation priorities? 
o Is development outlawed or substantially limited in the sending area? 
o Is there a compelling reason to use a TDR program rather than simply rely on 
existing development restrictions?  Is this reason one of equity?  Is there a threat 
of a Measure 37 claim? 
o Does the value of the development right constitute a great enough percentage of 
the fair market value of the total property that fee title purchase makes more sense 
than a TDR program (given the complications of TDRs and the pubic access that 
would result from fee title purchase)?  If the development right has substantial 
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value relative to the total property value, it would also suggest that current 
regulations are insufficient to limit development. 
• Receiving area 
o Are the potential receiving areas proximate to the sending area? 
o Is base zoning density in the receiving area lower than is desirable? 
o Can the receiving area accommodate more development than there are credits 
available?  Mittra (1996) suggests twice as much development capacity as credits 
available to create sufficient demand? 
o Will the urban growth boundary serve to increase demand for higher density 
development in the receiving area? 
o Will the value of the development credit to the receiving area developer be greater 
than or equal to the value of the credit to the owner of the sending area property? 
o Will the locality be able to afford the planning, infrastructure, and service costs 
necessitated by higher density in the receiving area? 
o Is higher density politically feasible?  Is it palatable to existing landowners in the 
receiving area? 
Given the complexity of TDR programs, it may be worth exploring a more straight-
forward means of conservation such as fee title or conservation easement purchase, charging 
higher development impact fees, conservation banking, or the purchase of development rights.  
This is particularly true given that a TDR program may effectively act as a tax on increased 
urban densities (higher urban densities being a desired outcome of Metro’s efforts). 
Windfalls Tax: 
Related to the previous discussion of regulation’s potentially positive effects on land 
values is the concept of windfalls.  Inclusion of a private property in the Urban Growth 
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Boundary (UGB) confers upon the landowner the ability to develop their property at high 
densities.  Without such inclusion, a property owner’s use of the land is limited by the under-
provision of urban infrastructure such as schools, sewer, water, transit, and roads and is 
constrained by low-density zoning.  Consequently, properties within the UGB carry a premium 
value that reflects development potential and the provision of urban infrastructure.  This 
premium value is sometimes referred to as an unearned increment or “windfall” as it arises 
through no improvements made by the private landowner.  Through annexation into the UGB 
and the public provision of capital improvements, private land values are drastically increased.  
This unearned increment is also apparent in lands immediately outside the UGB which carry a 
speculative value that reflects anticipated annexation. 
 Metro’s estimates of how land values are affected by the UGB are summarized below. 
The data is based on the assumption that the acre of land within the UGB would be zoned single 
family detached with a density of Metro’s average of 6.5 units per acre (5,000 sq. ft. lots): 
“Data for Exhibit A are taken from 2004 and 2005 sales of land and homes within 1,250 feet of 
the UGB.  Agricultural value is the average of assessors’ land value for agriculturally designated 
acreages adjacent to the UGB including both farm deferred and non-deferred properties” (quotes 
and table 1 are from an unpublished Metro proposal outline dated October 20, 2005). 
Table 1 - Value Increase Pyramid from Agriculture to SFR Build Out – One Acre at Edge 
of UGB 
 
Status of Acre      Value per Acre 
Agricultural Land at UGB $20,000 
Raw Land inside UGB $208,000 
Completed Single Family Residential Lots $500,000 - $650,000 
Build out with SFR Homes $2,150,000 
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“Exhibit A indicates that land valued at $20,000 for agricultural purposes2 immediately 
outside the boundary jumps first to $208,000 per acre as raw land (with appropriate 
zoning).  Upon subdivision and provision of streets, sidewalks, sewers, water, drainage 
and payment of system development charges (SDCs), the price per acre with “ready-to-
build” lots increases to $500,000 - $650,000 per acre.  Assuming the 2005 average price 
home for the area (2,400 sq. ft with 4,900 sq. ft. lot), the built-out acres carry a total value 
of $2,150,000 – more than a 100-fold increase over their original agricultural value” 
(Metro, unpublished proposal outline dated October 20, 2005).  
 
 The amenity effects that UGB inclusion and proximity to urban infrastructure has on 
property values may be demonstrated.  In the following analysis of raw land (no buildings) in 
Multnomah County, OR, I have not used sale data, but have instead relied on assessed values.  
Though assessed values are lower than market values, they may be used as a rough measure of 
willingness to pay for proximity to public infrastructure.  For the purposes of this analysis, public 
infrastructure includes schools and hospitals (though no distinction has been made between 
public and private), parks, libraries, light rail stops, and transit centers.  Given that urban 
infrastructure is so pervasive (one need only look at the extent of road networks for proof), it is 
difficult to account for all of the private land value created through public investments.  
However, this analysis hopes to examine some of its effects.  Doing so may add some nuance to 
the discussion of planning’s impacts on private land values.  Distances to infrastructure were 
calculated for each vacant property using a Geographical Information System.  The correlations 
between infrastructure and property values are summarized below in table 2: 
                                                
2 “The $20,000 per acre value is considerably higher than the value of land for agriculture alone; all property within 
several miles of the UGB carries a speculative premium that reflects market assessments related to its likelihood of 
being included within the UGB at some time in the future and its possible use as rural residential property” (October 
20, 2005 Metro unpublished proposal). 
 23 
Table 2 – Correlations between per acre value and distance to infrastructure in 
Multnomah County, Oregon 




















Correlation -.162(**) -.098(**) -.137(**) -.166(**) -.136(**) -.062(**) -.045(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
  N 25698 25698 25698 25698 25698 25698 25698 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 The above results indicate that there is a strong negative correlation between increasing 
distance to infrastructure and property values.  Put more simply, the closer a property is to a light 
rail stop or a park, the higher the property’s value is likely to be.  The expansion of Portland’s 
UGB is a viable mechanism for capturing a portion of this value that is attributable to public 
investments. 
Based on the fact that private land value is, in large part, created by public investments, 
Metro is considering a “Fair Growth and Farmlands” policy which would capture a portion of the 
increased private land value that results from UGB annexation.  Funds collected from the value 
capture tax would be used to pay for capital improvements and planning within the UGB 
expansion area as well as paying for regional needs which are indirectly related to UGB 
expansions (e.g. increased regional mass transit capacity).  The revenue would also be used to 
fund farmland protection through the use of conservation easements.  Finally, the funds would 
provide a pot of money from which to pay valid Measure 37 claims (thus far, regulations have 
been waived, but no claimant has received compensation).  All of these needs are linked to urban 
growth management and this tax would provide a mechanism for equitable distribution of the 




Subsidies and Incentives 
 These types of land use planning tools typically involve the government offering an 
incentive or subsidy for adherence to more stringent land use regulations than would otherwise 
be required.  An example of such a program is the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP).  Under this program, private land owners may receive 
funding for retiring agricultural lands from production and undertaking specified restoration 
activities.  Oregon’s Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP) is allied with the 
USDA program.  CREP makes a one-time payment of four times the annual rental rate for each 
streamside acre when 50% of the land along a five mile stretch is enrolled in the USDA 
Conservation Reserve Program.  It is not required that the acreage be contiguous. 
Supporters claim that subsidy programs encourage private landowners to view habitat as 
something positive rather than a potential Endangered Species Act liability (Parkhurst and 
Shogren 2005).  Critics of incentive programs maintain that these funds would be better utilized 
in purchasing the properties outright.  According to Donahue, a purely incentive-based program 
without a regulatory backbone will ultimately fail because such programs often involve no 
systematic planning and are characterized by piecemeal efforts.  Additionally, funds for such 
programs are finite and paying for every benefit to threatened species on private land (or 
compensation for lost development opportunities) is contrary to the development of a land ethic 
among private landowners (Donahue 2005). 
Purely Voluntary Programs 
Included here are land use planning tools that involve the public purchase of real property 
from willing sellers.  Such methods offer the public the highest degree of certainty for the 
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perpetual protection of habitat (or historic landmarks, as the case may be).  The greatest obstacle 
for such programs is the source of funding. 
Fee title purchase of lands: 
Fee title purchase of lands is perhaps the most straight-forward means of both achieving 
conservation goals and compensating private landowners.  Frequently employed by non-profit 
land trusts and public agencies alike, the purchase of lands is limited only by financial resources 
and the willingness of landowners to sell their property.  Clearly, the financial limitation is a 
significant one.  Also notable is the reluctance of many counties, particularly in the western U.S. 
where public lands make up a large portion of the landscape, to have private lands taken off the 
tax rolls. 
Metro has successfully acquired over 8,000 acres since the passage of a 1995 bond 
initiative.  This bond money is now largely spent.  Additional land purchases from willing sellers 
are contingent on additional funding.  Two such sources could be the passage of a new bond 
measure or requesting appropriations from the federal Land and Water Conservation Fund 
(LWCF). 
Conservation easements: 
In cases where there is a reluctance to bring land into public ownership, the purchase of 
conservation easements has proved an effective means of accomplishing conservation objectives 
while maintaining private ownership.  Again, barring the donation of an easement and an 
endowment to cover perpetual monitoring costs, there is a significant financial outlay involved in 
the purchase of a conservation easement.  The costs of performing habitat inventories and 
drafting an easement that clearly articulates acceptable stewardship practices are worth 
considering.  In some cases, the costs of fee title purchase and the total costs of a conservation 
easement may be comparable.  That said, conservation easements are particularly effective in 
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protecting farmlands.  Drafted carefully, they can offer perpetual protection to habitat and 
agricultural uses that is otherwise not possible with zoning restrictions (which may be amended 
over time).  Easements must, however, be monitored in perpetuity in order to ensure compliance 
and validity.  If the easement is not consistently enforced, it may not stand up in court.  These 
monitoring activities require that the holder of the easement be a stable entity with a long-term 
commitment and financial resources.  If Oregon localities are no longer able to rely on zoning 
restrictions because of the prospect of a Measure 37 claim, conservation easements offer an 
alternative, albeit an expensive one. 
Purchase of development rights (PDR): 
 In essence, the same as a conservation easement, a PDR program avoids the TDR 
complications of predicting demand for development credits.  Development rights are simply 
purchased and extinguished without being transferred to a different property.  The shortcomings 
of a PDR program are the same as those of a conservation easement program.  A PDR program 
relies on willing sellers, thereby potentially precluding a landscape-wide approach.  Funding may 
be difficult to secure and the value of the development rights may be a substantial portion of the 
property’s total fair market value.  In such a case it may make more sense to pursue fee title 
purchase, thereby providing complete public control and access to the property. 
Rustad (2006) points out a further complication in determining the value of development 
rights on lands where zoning precludes development (as in the case of EFU zoning in Oregon).  
EFU zoning would tend to suggest that no development value exists.  This may be resolved by 
the appraiser if it can be determined that a landowner would likely prevail in a Measure 37 claim 
given the tenure of their land ownership, thereby showing that a development right does exist.  




Funding Sources for Public Land Acquisition 
Land transfer tax: 
 An excise tax on all real estate transactions in the Portland area could fund the public 
acquisition of properties that are conservation priorities.  The tax would provide an explicit link 
between the need to conserve land and allowing for urban growth if it were only assessed on the 
sale of newly built houses.  A real estate transfer tax was recently before voters in Clallam 
County, WA.  This .5% tax was intended to preserve agricultural lands in this rural area of the 
Olympic Peninsula.  A large effort against the tax was undertaken by both the Washington and 
National Associations of Realtors out of concern that such a tax would have a negative impact on 
all real estate transactions.  Their campaign, “Stop Taxing the American Dream,” maintains that 
the tax would prevent many from being able to afford a house.  The tax only received 41.76% of 
the vote.  Six other Puget Sound counties including King and Snohomish have voted on similar 
excise taxes; all have failed at the ballot box (Pryne 2005).  Research could be done on how such 
a tax would affect the elasticity of demand of new home buyers.  It may be more politically 
feasible to rely on impact fees for new developments rather than trying to garner support for a 
new tax, particularly given the nature of Oregon laws in regards to the creation of new taxes. 
Land and Water Conservation Fund 
 Established by Congress in 1964, the Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF) is 
used by federal, state, or local governments to acquire lands, wetland, and water rights for the 
benefit of the public.  LWCF gets most of its money from fees charged for offshore oil and gas 
drilling.  Though it may be a minor point, the fact that the funds are derived from regulation is of 





 Government agencies have long used this mechanism for consolidating the most 
important habitats and transferring less-vital lands into private ownership.  Frequently criticized 
on the basis of the decision of what to acquire and what to dispose of, the establishment of fair 
market values can also become contentious.  That said, given the shortage of funds for outright 
purchases, land exchanges are useful. 
Land exchanges are typically brokered by a non-profit land trust.  The land trust ideally 
signs bargain sale option agreements with the willing sellers of lands to be conserved and finds 
private buyers for government surplus lands.  The non-profit covers its overhead costs by 
purchasing conservation land for less than fair market value (in the case of a bargain sale).  The 
land owner may claim the difference between the fair market value and the sale price as a 
charitable contribution.  The land trust also attempts to sell the surplus government lands for 
more than the appraised value.  The latter part of the transaction is what frequently makes land 
exchanges controversial though it is necessary in order for the land trust to remain solvent. 
What works? 
 Many of the voluntary or quasi-regulatory planning tools explored herein offer great 
promise.  Most have been used with success either in Oregon or elsewhere.  However, even the 
most successful of these tools are no substitute for a coordinated statewide approach that relies 
on regulation when necessary (Nelson, 1992).  With diminished reliance on regulation, it can be 
said with a degree of certainty that the natural character of Oregon will be harmed.  This is not 
only a concern for those who consider themselves environmentalists, but also those who value 
clean air and water.  Even the most pragmatic of Oregonians who simply wish to lower property 
taxes and maintain the value of real estate investments should be concerned about the 
implications of Measure 37.  What has also become clear is that regulations are not the best 
 29 
solution for all land use problems.  Oregonians may need to consider a more flexible approach to 
land use planning that uses regulations when necessary, but relies on the free-market when 
possible. 
Achieving Oregon’s Statewide Planning Goals 
 In considering any land use planning instruments, we must have a frank discussion about 
whether they are able to accomplish Oregon’s Statewide Planning Goals.  If non-regulatory 
instruments are incapable of achieving these Goals and we have no tolerance for regulation, it 
would seem that we don’t truly believe in the importance of the Statewide Planning Goals.  
Given the evidence that Oregonians do, in fact, still subscribe to the fundamental ideals of the 
Statewide Planning Goals, we must address the perceived inequities of the planning system and 
re-engage the public in a discussion of why regulations are sometimes necessary and how they 
are for the common good. 
Any discussion about the Statewide Planning Goals and the means thereto needs to be on-
going.  Public participation in this deliberative process is critical to its success.  Only through 
such on-going discussions will we begin to transcend the overly-simplistic arguments about 
fairness and appreciate the real issue of the common good and how to achieve it.  It is perhaps 
useful to look at several pertinent Statewide Planning Goals through the lens of regulatory vs. 
non-regulatory planning instruments.  Below is a discussion of the goals which are more overtly 
connected to land use decisions in the Portland region. 
Statewide Planning Goal 1 – Citizen Involvement 
“To develop a citizen involvement program that insures the opportunity for citizens to be 
involved in all phases of the planning process.” 
 
A fundamental drawback of reducing reliance on regulatory instruments is that citizen 
involvement is also severely curtailed.  Non-regulatory instruments typically have little use for 
public participation.  In such a system, decisions are made by individuals and the private market.  
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The ability to voice concerns and effectuate change would be limited by the contents of one’s 
pocketbook.  Because land use decisions have profound implications for all Oregonians, a lack of 
public participation is cause for great concern.  Regulation, despite its current bad reputation, is 
the surest means of approximating the common good through deliberative public involvement. 
Statewide Planning Goal 2 – Land Use Planning 
“To establish a land use planning process and policy framework as a basis for all decision and 
actions related to use of land and to assure an adequate factual base for such decisions and 
actions.” 
 
 The most significant shortcoming of non-regulatory instruments is that since they rely on 
individual willingness to participate, their use is typically opportunistic.  Thus, they do not 
involve a landscape-wide planning process as we know it.  Absent regulation, programs and 
incentives are used when possible instead of when needed, failing to achieve the Goals’ intended 
consistency and coordination in land use planning. 
Goal 3 – Agricultural Lands 
“To preserve and maintain agricultural lands.” 
 Many of the instruments discussed herein could be used in achieving the goals of a 
program to preserve and maintain agricultural lands.  The difficulty of relying on non-regulatory 
methods is the risk that such a program will lack the aforementioned consistency.  Agriculture 
functions best as an agglomeration economy, whereby farms benefit from economies of scale 
and avoid conflicts with other (residential) land uses.  The decision of one farmer to subdivide 
her property will likely have negative repercussions for all nearby farms. 
Exclusive Farm Use (EFU) zoning provides consistency and predictability to farmers, 
sending a clear signal to the market that development is not possible.  Other instruments 
discussed herein (such as conservation easements) provide added protection, compensation to 
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farm owners, and property tax relief (though Oregon, unlike most states, defers taxes in EFU 
zones) that complement EFU designations. 
Goal 4 – Forest Lands 
 “To conserve forest lands by maintaining the forest land base and to protect the state's 
forest economy by making possible economically efficient forest practices that assure the 
continuous growing and harvesting of forest tree species as the leading use on forest land 
consistent with sound management of soil, air, water, and fish and wildlife resources and to 
provide for recreational opportunities and agriculture.” 
 
 The movement of Oregon’s economy away from extractive industries necessitates new 
means of deriving sufficient profits from forest lands.  Statewide Planning Goal 4 relies on 
zoning in order to retain lands in forest use.  Zoning itself is not problematic if used in 
conjunction with other programs/instruments that provide a means of forest profitability.  Ideally, 
such programs encourage sustainable practices.  Significant work is being done to develop new 
economies in the state’s privately-owned forests.  Such programs include carbon banking and the 
local manufacture of value-added timber products out of small diameter trees.  The use of small 
diameter trees has the added benefit of reducing the high fuel loads (due to years of fire 
suppression and unsustainable logging practices) that have contributed to the catastrophic 
wildfires of recent years. 
Goal 5 – Natural Resources, Scenic and Historic Areas, and Open Spaces 
“To protect natural resources and conserve scenic and historic areas and open spaces.” 
 
 This Goal is one of the primary focuses of this paper.  As has been discussed, regulatory 
and non-regulatory tools may be used towards the furtherance of the Goal, but regulations 
provide the most consistency and coordinated approach to protection.  Absent such regulations, 




Goal 6 - Air, Water, and Land Resources Quality 
“To maintain and improve the quality of the air, water and land resources of the state.” 
 
 The choices that the Metro region makes in shaping its urban form have enormous impact 
on air, water, and land resources quality.  Many aspects of this goal are beyond the scope of this 
paper.  However, it can be said that attainment of this Goal is best achieved through the 
deliberate creation of a compact urban form that is less reliant on automobiles.  Given the focus 
of this paper, the components of this Goal are discussed at greater length below, under Goal 14, 
Urbanization. 
Goal 8 – Recreational Needs 
“To satisfy the recreational needs of the citizens of the state and visitors and, where appropriate, 
to provide for the siting of necessary recreational facilities including destination resorts.” 
 
 Goal 8 lends itself to non-regulatory approaches to land use planning.  Furtherance of this 
Goal, as it affects private landowners, largely consists of the public purchase of land from 
willing sellers. 
Goal 13 – Energy Conservation 
“Land and uses developed on the land shall be managed and controlled so as to maximize the 
conservation of all forms of energy, based upon sound economic principles.” 
 
 As with Goal 6, since this paper is concerned with land use, this Goal is best addressed 
below in Goal 14, Urbanization. 
Goal 14 – Urbanization 
“To provide for an orderly and efficient transition from rural to urban land use, to accommodate 
urban population and urban employment inside urban growth boundaries, to ensure efficient use 
of land, and to provide for livable communities.” 
 
 The urban form that Portland assumes in the future will largely determine the outcomes 
of a number of the aforementioned Statewide Planning Goals in the Portland region.  The 
successful implementation of policies to further this Goal is essential to the preservation of 
farmland, forest land, habitat, and energy, and the maintenance of air and water quality.  The 
 33 
success of Portland in promoting a compact urban form stands in stark contrast to the majority of 
American cities.  Underlying this success is the use of the urban growth boundary.  While many 
of the non-regulatory and hybrid land use planning instruments considered herein can help to 
further Goal 14, they are no substitute for the use of the UGB.  Short of public acquisition of all 
surrounding greenbelt lands (which would not really qualify as growth management, so much as 
it would be a zero growth policy), the UGB is the most effective means of providing a 
framework for an efficient conversion of rural land to urban uses. 
However, it should be emphasized that the UGB can not accomplish Goal 14 on its own.  
As Porter points out, “growth boundaries should build on and logically link to comprehensive 
planning policies, zoning requirements, and infrastructure programs, rather than substitute for 
adequate planning.” (Porter, 1997)  Additionally, I would include all of the instruments discussed 
herein as complements to the UGB. 
Goal 15 – Willamette River Greenway 
“To protect, conserve, enhance and maintain the natural, scenic, historical, agricultural, 
economic and recreational qualities of lands along the Willamette River as the Willamette River 
Greenway.” 
 
 The text of this goal envisions that it will be furthered largely through ordinances, rules, 
regulations, and permits.  A non-regulatory approach to achieving the Goal is the public 
acquisition of lands along the river.  Clearly, this is not feasible in all or even a majority of cases, 
necessitating reliance on regulations or quasi-regulatory means.  One such quasi-regulatory 
means is being pursued by the Willamette Partnership, wherein developers and others that are 
required to mitigate habitat destruction may purchase conservation credits that go towards the 
restoration of the Willamette’s ecosystem.  The initial focus of the program is efforts which help 
to reduce water temperatures in the Willamette that have increased as a result of tree canopy loss. 
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Instrument effectiveness and feasibility 
As discussed in the context of the Statewide Planning Goals, many of the instruments 
presented herein are worth considering, but they are not a panacea.  Following is a matrix (Table 
3) which attempts to summarize some of the main land use planning tools.  The instruments are 
measured according to: administrative/implementation difficulty and costs, who bears the direct 
costs, effectiveness in achieving environmental protection, and symbolic value (does the 
instrument emphasize personal liberty or security in achieving goals?) (Ozawa 2006). 





































































 What begins emerge from the above matrix and the preceding analysis is that regulation 
provides the highest degree of certainty of conserving agricultural and open space lands. Though 
such regulations are not without costs, it is overly-simplistic to claim that those subject to 
regulation bear all of the costs and receive none of the benefits.  Though some of the incentive or 
market-based approaches to conservation hold promise, they are, by nature, insufficiently 
reliable in ensuring the needed outcomes to meet our Statewide Planning Goals.  Complete 
reliance on such instruments would make strategic conservation difficult and result in piecemeal 
results. 
The fairness issue 
If we are to continue to rely on regulations, the Metro region will need to contend with 
the issues of who receives the benefits and who receives the burdens of regulation.  In those 
cases where a Measure 37 claim is filed, it may be useful for the state to consider a more 
sophisticated system of determining the impacts of regulations and public policies on real 
property values.  Such a system will be complex and will require great expertise to develop, but 
is warranted given the alternative of accepting claims at face value and either waiving the 
regulation or paying the requested amount with no real consideration of the validity of the dollar 
amount. 
Only through this process will we begin to truly appreciate that a lack of regulation is the 
greatest threat to property values and fairness.  This process may determine that some 
landowners are bearing the brunt of regulations that benefit others, it may infuriate some, but at 
least it will begin a more honest discussion of why we engage in long-term land use planning and 




Additional Topics to Explore: 
 
Fairness tribunals: The State needs to develop expertise in assessing the value lands in regards to 
regulations and infrastructure.  This type of expertise would provide for a more nuanced 
response to claims of regulatory takings. 
 
Societal pressure to conserve: Uphoff and Langholz (1998) illustrate the importance of societal 
pressures in the success of ecosystem conservation.  Private conservation efforts in Costa Rica 
have been undertaken in the absence of stringent legal requirements and with only nominal 
economic incentives (Uphoff and Langholz 1998).  Efforts to engender a wide-spread 
environmental ethic are of the utmost importance for the long-term success of any regulatory or 
non-regulatory planning program. 
 
Premium pricing for sustainably harvested wood or wild-caught fish: Similar in concept to 
labeling for organic foods, the further promotion of sustainably harvested, manufactured, or 
caught goods may provide a positive incentive for sustainable land management practices.  The 
Forestry Stewardship Council (FSC) has designed such a system for sustainably harvested wood.  
The organization, Salmon Safe, has created a system for certifying farms which utilize 
agricultural techniques that are compatible with salmon habitat conservation. 
 
Subsidies for sustainable agriculture - Given the huge subsidies for commodity-type farming, 
should we be considering subsidies for small-scale farming as a means of making such practices 
more competitive and thus increasing potential profits for EFU lands? 
 
Non-regulatory planning tools to encourage the provision of affordable housing: Many of the 
same mechanisms that could provide for affordable housing may also work for land conservation 
and vice versa. 
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